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ABSTRACT 
Threats to information security are proliferating rapidly, placing demanding requirements on 
protecting tangible and intangible business and individual assets. Biometrics can improve security 
by replacing or complementing traditional security technologies. This tutorial discusses the 
strengths and weaknesses of biometrics and traditional security approaches, current and future 
applications of biometrics, performance evaluation measures of biometric systems, and privacy 
issues surrounding the new technology.   
Keywords: biometrics, computer security, information security, privacy 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The idea behind biometrics is not new. Even in ancient Egypt administrative workers used unique 
body characteristics to identify construction workers and ensure a fair distribution of food.  
Ashbourn [2000] relates a story about Khasekem, an administrator under the Pharaoh Khaefre, 
who was responsible for distributing food among construction workers. When giving out food 
allowances to the craftsmen, he discovered that some of them would attempt to receive their food 
allowance twice. To prevent future cases of fraud, Khasekem decided to create a profile for each 
of the construction workers. Besides such basic information as name, age, place of origin, and 
occupation, each profile included some of the unique physical and behavioral characteristics of 
the worker. Without the benefit of today’s computing power, Khasekem managed to employ 
biometrics to eliminate what we now call double dipping.  
Closer to modern times, Frenchman Alphonse Bertillon proposed a methodology for identifying 
criminals by anatomical measurements. This methodology, called judicial anthropometry, became 
popular in Europe and the U.S. In 1823, the research of the Czech Jan Evangelista Purkinje 
forced the scientific community to accept the idea that fingerprints are unique for each individual. 
The scientific thinking which emerged during the nineteenth century allowed for the development 
of real-world applications of fingerprint technology in the beginning of the twentieth century. In 
1901 Scotland Yard became the first police force to adopt a fingerprinting system. Fingerprinting 
technology, now used throughout the world, is the best known example of biometrics.  Other 
types of biometrics were not widely used until the end of the twentieth century when computers 
and other technologies made new approaches possible. 
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The tragic events of 9/11 created a new wave of interest in biometrics in the United States and 
other countries. This revived interest can be attributed to the potential for computer-powered 
biometric technologies to bring national security to a higher level of effectiveness. In June 2004, 
The Department of Homeland Security awarded a multi-billion dollar contract for the US-VISIT 
project to Accenture [eWeek, 2004]. The US-VISIT project involves developing a computer 
system that uses fingerprints and face recognition to track millions of visitors to the United States. 
Michael Chertoff, the Secretary of Homeland Security, says that the primary reason behind using 
biometrics for tighter boarder control is that traditional security approaches do not provide an 
adequate level of security [Long, 2005]. For Chertoff, “in the area of international travel, 
biometrics is the way forward in virtually every respect” [Long, 2005].  
The UK Passport Service (UKPS) in partnership with several governmental bodies and Atos 
Origin, a consulting firm, is working on introducing national identity cards (passports) with 
biometrics features [UKPS, 2005]. A number of other countries are either piloting or planning to 
introduce National ID cards with biometric security features [Nanavati et al., 2002].  
Endorsements of biometric technology by influential organizations, as well as extensive coverage 
of the technology by the mass-media, may create an impression that biometrics is totally 
replacing old approaches to security. This is not true, at least at this stage of development of the 
technology. For biometrics to become commonplace, the technology must be reliable, 
inexpensive, easy to use, deployable in a variety of environments, and non-invasive. Moreover, 
the end users of biometric solutions must be educated about the technology and comfortable with 
the privacy implications of the technology.  
A decision to implement biometric security systems must be based on thorough comparative 
evaluation of biometrics in relation to traditional security approaches. To perform an evaluation, 
both the basic operating principles of the various biometric solutions and their strengths and 
weaknesses must be understood. Privacy implications of biometrics are also important when 
deploying biometric solutions. The purpose of this tutorial is to educate the reader on these (and 
many other) dimensions. 
This tutorial begins with the discussion of numerous security threats faced today by a typical 
organization. Then we discuss strengths and weaknesses of traditional security approaches in 
addressing these threats (Section II). Section III begins with an elaborate definition of the term 
“biometrics” followed by a discussion of some of the fundamental operating principles behind 
biometric systems. After that we discuss, in detail, each of the main types of biometrics 
technologies (Section IV). For each of these types of biometrics, we discuss operating principles, 
advantages and disadvantages, and vulnerabilities to spoofing. The section also looks at some of 
the less common and emerging types of biometric technologies.  In Section V we provide 
examples of current and future applications of biometric technologies. We look at biometric 
system performance from both technical and social perspectives in Section VI. The tutorial ends 
with a discussion of privacy concerns related to biometrics (Section VII) and with implications for 
research (Section VIII).  
PROLIFERATION OF SECURITY THREATS 
Even though the current publicity surrounding biometrics can be largely attributed to its recent 
application in the public sector, biometric security technologies evolved because of the 
proliferation of computer security threats. It was not until the mid-to-late 1980s that networked 
computing became sufficiently ubiquitous for penetrations to become a significant problem. The 
growth of the Internet, e-commerce, and other computer technologies since the 1990s magnified 
existing threats while giving rise to new classes of threats (Table 1). Driven by these threats, what 
were then new computer security approaches, such as virtual private networks (VPN) and public 
key cryptography, gained widespread popularity?  
 
Communications of the Association for Information Systems (Volume 16, 2005) 937- 966                         939    
Future Security Approaches and Biometrics by S. Bourkhonine, V. Krotov, and B. Rupert       
Table 1. Perceived Computer Security Threats Comparison: 1992 Versus 2004  
Reprinted with permission from Computer Security Institute, 2004 
 
Biometric technology, the subject of this tutorial, is an emerging security approach. One of the 
primary differences between biometrics and some other new computer security technologies is 
that biometrics is not a pure network security measure. While security measures such as 
cryptography and VPN are used primarily to prevent unauthorized access to intangible resources, 
biometrics can be used in both network security and more tangible domains, such as access 
control and crime/terrorism prevention.  Since biometrics can be applied in many domains, the 
technology can, potentially, become a widely used security approach. 
II. TRADITIONAL SECURITY APPROACHES 
A number of security approaches have been developed in response to proliferating threats to 
security. Both traditional and biometric security approaches can be broken down into two general 
types:  
• passive,  and  
• active.  
Passive approaches are like a shield - they protect against a clear and present danger such as a 
hacker attempting to access a computer system. Traditional security technologies are mostly 
passive.  Active approaches are more like prevention via a preemptive strike, for instance, 
arresting terrorists before they plant a bomb. One of the traditional ways to search proactively for 
and identify lawbreakers relies on massive use of manpower such as police on patrol or security 
guards in casinos watching closed circuit television in the hopes of identifying known cheats. 
Needless to say, that measure of active security is costly and is not widely used in a commercial 
environment. Even data mining numerous electronic databases (e.g. in an attempt to detect 
suspicious activities of a suspect) may be troublesome, since a suspect may use multiple 
identities.  
Another fundamental weakness of traditional security approaches is that they are based on either  
• what you know (i.e., password or PIN) or  
• what you have (i.e., keys, cards, etc.), or a 
• combination of both (ATM card + PIN) [Ratha et al., 2001].  
A fundamental problem with PINs and passwords is that, to be effective, they must be complex. 
However, complexity of passwords and PINs makes it hard for users to remember them. Because 
of that, a user may write down his or her password on a note and attach it to the monitor or to the 
back side of the keyboard. Thus, a strong password policy may not contribute to overall system 
security [Reid, 2004]. Another fundamental problem with PINs and passwords is that they identify 
a card rather than its user [Ashbourn, 2000]. In other words, even though a person knows the PIN 
associated with the card or password associated with the username, that person may not actually 
be the owner of the card or the authorized user. In addition, passwords are often easy to guess, 
Most severe threats in 1992 Most severe threats in 2004 
Natural Hazards 
Inadequate control over media 
Weak and Ineffective Controls 
Hacking 
Access to system by 
competitors 
 
 
Theft of Proprietary Info 
Denial of Service 
Computer Viruses 
Insider Net Abuse 
Financial Fraud  
Laptop theft  
 
Sabotage 
System Penetration 
Abuse of Wireless Network 
Telecom Fraud 
Unauthorized Insider Access 
Telecom Eavesdropping 
Misuse of Public Web   
      Applications 
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crack by brute force, or obtain through other means such as social engineering (e.g. an intruder 
posing as a system administrator calling an employee and asking for the user’s network 
password). Obtaining the card and PIN or the username and password might be difficult, but it is 
far from impossible. A serious flaw with this possession requirement is that anybody can gain 
access to a resource if she or he has a security artifact (e.g. a key or a card). Many of the security 
artifacts can be easily counterfeited [Ashbourn, 2000]. Even sophisticated security mechanisms, 
such as an ATM card, can be lost, stolen or maliciously taken away and used by an unauthorized 
person. Thus, card/PIN or username/password combinations provide relatively weak network 
security.  Table 2 provides a brief overview of strengths and weaknesses of traditional security 
approaches.  
Table 2. Traditional Security Approaches  
Security Approach Strengths Weaknesses 
Lock and key  
Lock and key is probably the oldest security 
mechanism used to protect assets 
Low cost, simplicity, 
ease of use, robustness 
Can be easily duplicated; not 
convenient to carry; can be 
lost or stolen; hard to manage 
in large organizations 
Numeric keypad  
A security mechanism that requires users to enter a 
password using a numeric keypad to gain access to a 
premise or an asset 
Easy to use and 
maintain, robust 
Often forgotten; low security 
Magnetic stripe card 
Magnetic stripe card is usually a plastic card with a 
magnetic strip that contains authentication 
information. Credit cards are an example of a 
magnetic stripe card 
Low cost, easy to 
reprogram, easy to 
manage 
Easy to duplicate; sensitive to 
environment 
Punched card 
Punched card is usually a paper card with holes 
punched on it to record information, such as access 
code 
Cheap to make and easy 
to manage 
Easy to duplicate; low security 
Proximity card 
Proximity card is a wireless access security device, 
which opens a premise when being placed in the 
immediate vicinity of a radio frequency reader that 
wirelessly reads authentication information from the 
card 
 
No physical contact—
very robust 
Expensive and interferes with 
other electrical devices 
Wiegand card [Ashbourn, 2000] 
Wiegand card employs a unique technology that is 
used to transmit information between a card and a 
slot-based reader  
 
Robust and secure; non-
contact; can be used in 
harsh environments 
Expensive 
Infrared card 
Bar code information on an infrared card can be read 
only with the help on an infrared reader – it cannot be 
seen by a person or copied with a copy machine [ATI, 
2004] 
Secure, inexpensive Can be easily duplicated, 
sensitive to harsh environment 
Smart card 
Smart cards are plastic cards with an embedded 
microprocessor and/or memory chip used for storing 
information and providing secure exchange between 
the card and a reader 
Secure; can store a 
relatively large amount of 
data 
 
 
Relatively expensive, requires 
direct contact, card contacts 
are sensitive to dust and wear 
Adapted from Ashbourn, 2000   
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III. BIOMETRICS 
DEFINITION 
Biometrics can be defined briefly as methods for recognizing people based on unique 
physiological or behavioral characteristics [Ashbourn, 2000; Jain et al., 2000].  Biometrics 
introduces the third “pillar” of security [Reid, 2004]. Traditional security approaches rest on two 
pillars: something you know or something you have. Biometrics authenticates or identifies a 
person not as much on what she has or knows, but based on something she is (a measurable 
trait).  
Clarke [1999] provides an expanded definition of biometrics: person-identification techniques 
based on such difficult-to-alienate characteristics as appearance, social behavior, bio-dynamics, 
natural physiography, and imposed physical characteristics.  
• Appearance refers to details of a person’s general visual image, such as shape of a 
face distance between eyes, or height.  
• Social behavior can be manifested, for example, through voice particularities and 
body gestures.  
• Bio-dynamics includes the manner in which he or she writes a signature, performs a 
key-stroke, or moves a mouse.  
• Natural physiography refers to such characteristics as skull measurement or 
fingerprint sets.  
• Imposed physical characteristics involve artificial creation of physical characteristics 
of a person by, for example, implanting a microchip under the skin. 
Even though these characteristics provide a precise way of classifying different types of 
biometrics, biometric types are generally classified based on two generic categories: 
physiological and behavioral.  
A physiological biometric is a manifestation of some physical trait (e.g. fingerprint pattern or iris 
pattern). A behavioral biometric can also be based, in part, on physiological characteristics. For 
example, our voice is influenced, in part, by physical characteristics of the diaphragm. In a similar 
manner, the length and flexibility of our fingers probably influence, to some extent, our typing 
pattern. Still a behavioral type of biometric differs from a physiological one. While physiological 
traits are for the most part determined by Mother Nature, behavioral traits are learned. Thus, the 
manifestation of behavioral traits involves the application of cognitive processes.  
HOW BIOMETRIC TECHNOLOGIES WORK 
To discuss biometric technologies, the reader needs to understand the fundamental operating 
principles behind biometric systems. As in centuries past, biometric technology today relies on 
two fundamental mechanisms  
• authentication and  
• identification.  
The objective of authentication is to determine if a particular person is who she or he claims to be, 
for instance to cash a check. Identification systems, by contrast, capture a person's biometric 
information, say at an airport boarding gate, and then compare it with templates stored in a 
database looking for a match.  Authentication systems often require active participation by the 
individual.    
Authentication Systems 
The general process for authentication systems is outlined in Figure 1. The authentication 
process starts with, for example, an individual inserting a smart or magnetic card into a reader 
(instead of a card, the user may key in his or her username). If it is a smart card, the reader reads 
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Yes 
No 
a biometric template from the card. Otherwise, the reader reads the username. Afterwards, the 
user's live biometric information is captured and compared with the template either read from the 
smart card or obtained from the database. If the system determines that the individual is who she 
or he claims to be, access is granted.  Otherwise, access is denied.  While the authentication 
process looks like today’s common security systems, biometric systems differ in several respects.  
1. Biometric information captured from the individual attempting to use the card serves 
as a means of verifying that the person attempting to use the card is the person to 
whom the card was issued.  
2. People cannot forget biometrics as one might a PIN.   
3. Biometrics are unique for each person. 
Figure 1 shows the logic of a typical biometric authentication algorithm 
Identification Systems 
Identification systems are either passive to the individual (they can be used without the user’s 
knowledge) or are active (they require the individual to provide biometric data, that is they require 
active cooperation from the user). An example of a passive identification system would be a 
surveillance system at a stadium entrance that automatically captures face images of entering 
sports fans with the help of a digital camera. The face images captured are then passed to a 
computer that attempts to find a face match in a database containing face images of previously 
arrested violent fans. In this hypothetical example, the “troublemakers” are being identified 
passively.   
An iris recognition system installed near the entrance to an airport is a hypothetical example of an 
active identification system. A security guard may ask entering passengers to look into an iris 
recognition device. The iris image obtained is compared with iris images in a database that 
contains iris images of people with a criminal record or people whose personal background may 
indicate an inclination to terrorism. If a person is identified as such, more thorough search 
procedures may be applied to him or her before the person boards a plane. In this hypothetical 
example, criminals are being identified actively, that is they are made aware of the identification 
 
 
 
  
Figure 1. Biometric Authentication Algorithm 
Yes 
No 
Individual 
inserts 
smart or 
magnetic 
card into 
reader 
Reader 
captures 
biometric 
data 
Access is 
denied 
No, ID is not verified 
Individual IS NOT who 
he/she claims to be 
Access is 
granted 
Yes, ID is verified 
Individual IS who 
he/she claims to be 
 Verify  
   ID? 
Smart 
Card? 
Read 
user’s 
biometric 
template 
from card 
Captured 
biometric 
data is 
matched 
with pre-
saved 
biometric 
data 
(template)  
Read 
user’s ID 
from card 
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Biometrics are 
matched with 
records in a 
database 
Biometrics 
deleted  System DOES NOT 
know individual 
Security 
action  
    System KNOWS 
individual System captures 
biometric 
data of 
individual 
system by being asked for their cooperation. Figure 2 shows the conceptual algorithm behind an 
identification system.   
 
Figure 2. Biometric Identification Algorithm 
 
Under the identification algorithms, the individual does not take any intentional actions to identify 
himself or herself. The biometric data is captured by the system automatically, without the active 
participation of the user. Then the system uses the database to determine whether the system 
knows or does not know the individual. The database can consist of biometric data of people who 
impose a potential public threat (e.g. criminals, terrorists, violent sports fans). The primary task of 
the system is to try to find a match between the biometric data obtained from the individual and 
numerous biometric templates stored in the database. For this reason  the process of 
identification is also known as a “one-to-many” comparison [Ashbourn, 2000].  If this type of 
individual is identified by the system, then action results (e.g. the system notifies the police about 
the presence of the individual). Otherwise, the captured biometric data is deleted.  
IV. TYPES OF BIOMETRIC TECHNOLOGIES 
Biometric technologies can be classified according to the input data source they rely on for 
authentication and identification. Some of the most common body parts that are scanned by 
biometric systems are hands, faces, and eyes. Voice is also widely used in such applications as 
automated call centers. Table 3 presents a brief comparative overview of these biometric 
technology types.  
FINGERPRINTING 
Operating Principles 
The basis for this biometric is that the macro and micro features of each individual’s fingerprint 
are unique [Reid, 2004]. Fingerprints are usually captured with the help of a scanner. The image 
of a fingerprint can be enrolled and matched using one of the following algorithms: minutia-based, 
pattern-based, and hybrid. Enrollment is a process of acquiring a biometric image from an 
individual and storing it as a template in a database for future verification of the user’s identity.   
Minutia-based algorithms enroll and match fingerprints based on micro characteristics. Micro 
characteristics are small details (minutia) of a fingerprint that cannot be seen with the unaided 
eye. While minutia are classified into formalized categories, they can be seen as tiny “pixels” or 
groups of “pixels” that comprise an image of a fingerprint. Just like a digital image can be reduced 
to and analyzed based upon individual pixels, a fingerprint image can also be reduced to “pixels”. 
These “pixels” are building blocks of overall fingerprint patterns.  Since minutia-based algorithms  
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Table 3. Human Body and Types of Biometric Technologies  
Body 
Part 
Biometrics 
Type How it works Advantages Disadvantages Use Examples 
Fingerprinting 
(natural 
physiography) 
Uses unique 
micro and 
macro features 
of fingerprints  
 
Easy to use, 
inexpensive;  
fingerprints 
databases are 
already 
available 
Less reliable than 
retina or iris 
scanning 
 
Access control, 
computer 
access control 
 
Hands 
Hand geometry 
(natural 
physiography) 
Captures up to 
90 unique hand 
characteristics  
Easy to use 
and 
inexpensive 
Balky and sensitive 
to environment 
 
Access control, 
computer 
access 
Face 
Face 
Recognition 
(natural 
physiography/a
ppearance) 
Face 
recognition 
captures 
characteristics 
of a face either 
from video or 
still image and 
translates them 
into digital form 
Suitable for 
identification 
applications, 
relatively 
unobtrusive 
 
Prone to errors 
caused by 
environmental 
influences (e.g. 
light), and personal 
changes such as 
sunglasses, or 
facial hair.; 
expensive 
Identification 
(law enforce-
ment);  identity 
authentication  
Iris Scanning 
(natural 
physiography) 
Captures 
unique patterns 
of an iris 
Secure, does 
not need 
physical 
contact, non-
intrusive 
Expensive, 
sensitive to 
environmental 
conditions 
Eyes Retina 
Scanning 
(natural 
physiography) 
Captures 
unique pattern 
of blood vessels 
Secure and 
accurate 
Expensive; requires 
perfect alignment - 
usually a user must 
look in monocular 
or binocular 
receptacle 
High security 
applications in 
controlled 
environments 
Voice 
Voice 
Recognition 
(social 
behavior) 
Captures 
unique 
characteristics 
of voice 
Easy to use 
and 
understand, 
non-intrusive 
Sensitive to 
background 
conditions such as 
noises 
Automated call 
centers 
Adapted from Ashbourn  [2000] 
match fingerprints based on a large number of micro characteristics, these algorithms are usually 
more accurate in the matching process than pattern-based algorithms.  
Pattern-based algorithms use both micro and macro features of a fingerprint for matching and 
enrollment. Macro features are relatively large components of a fingerprint pattern that can be 
seen with the unaided eye (arches, loops, and whorls). When macro features are used, a larger 
fingerprint image is necessary (a sufficient number of micro features can be captured with only a 
portion of a  fingerprint image). Authentication based on macro features is usually faster than 
authentication based on micro features.  
Hybrid algorithm leverages the best features of both minutia-based and pattern based algorithm. 
Thus, hybrid algorithms can provide a middle ground between accuracy of minutia-based 
algorithm and speed of pattern-based algorithm.  
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Advantages 
Fingerprinting is the most widely used and accepted form of biometrics [Reid, 2004]. 
Fingerprinting has been used in criminal justice for many decades. As a result, it is based on 
rigorous procedures developed and verified over the years. Criminologists and the general public 
accept fingerprinting as a valid form of identification. The popularity of fingerprinting can be also 
explained by the relative ease with which this biometric is obtained. The computerized procedure 
for obtaining fingerprints (with the help of a finger scanner) is simple when compared to other 
biometric procedures, such as iris or retina scans. Another advantage of fingerprint biometrics is 
that fingerprint scanners are relatively cheap. A fingerprint scanner can be purchased for under 
$50, while an iris scanner can cost around $1000. Furthermore, fingerprint capture is not 
sensitive to environmental conditions (such as light) and can be deployed in virtually any 
environment.  
Disadvantages  
The three main disadvantages of fingerprint biometrics are the inability to enroll some users, 
performance deterioration over time, association with forensic applications, and possible short-
term changes in a person’s fingerprints [Nanavati et al., 2002].  
• Inability to enroll some users. A small percentage of the population may not (or may 
have difficulties with) enrolling in fingerprint systems. Certain ethnic groups (e.g. 
black and some Asians) and demographic groups (e.g. older people or people 
involved in manual labor) have less distinct fingerprints, which may prevent them 
from being enrolled or matched against stored templates. 
• Performance deterioration over time. Performance of some fingerprint systems is 
found to drop drastically because of daily wear. The drop in performance can be up 
to 25% over the span of 6 weeks for some finger-scan technologies.  
• Association with forensic application. Some individuals feel uncomfortable 
participating in authentication procedures traditionally associated with criminals.  
• Short-term changes in  fingerprints. Fingerprints of a person performing manual labor 
which involves damage to the hand’s skin or working with oily substances (e.g. an 
auto mechanic working without gloves) may change the fingerprints pattern or 
decrease the readability of the pattern. 
Spoofing 
In the context of biometric technologies, spoofing is defined as an attempt by an intruder to trick a 
biometric system into thinking that it is presented with a real biometric feature of an authorized 
user when it is not.  
Finger biometric systems can be spoofed [Reid, 2004]. Table 4 summarizes potential spoofing 
attacks and ways of mitigating the attacks. 
HAND GEOMETRY 
Operating Principles 
The hand geometry biometric uses the hand’s unique characteristics (e.g. the height and width of 
the hand and fingers) to authenticate a person. To enroll in the system, a user places his palm on 
a metallic sheet of the specialized hand geometry device. Cameras acquire the 3D image of the 
hand and use the image to match with a 3D image of the hand stored at the time of enrollment.  
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Table 4. Possible Attacks on Finger Biometric System 
 
Possible Attack  
Mitigating the attack 
Attacking the physical finger 
After obtaining a fingerprint image, a fake 
finger can be produced from a number of 
materials. In an extreme case, a individual’s 
finger can be severed and used for breaking 
into the system.  
• Sensors measuring temperature or detecting pulse 
can be used to detect whether the finger is “alive” 
(e.g. measuring temperature or detecting pulse).  
• Multiple fingers can be used to authenticate a 
person. Capturing fingerprint images of several 
fingers without the person knowing is much harder 
than obtaining an image of just one finger.  
• Finger biometrics can be used together with 
passwords or tokens to strengthen authentication.   
Using artifacts 
 After a person places a finger on a scanner, 
the image of the finger can be left on the 
scanning surface. An intruder can place an 
object (e.g. a plastic bag with water) on the 
scanning surface to trick the system into 
thinking that an actual finger is placed. This 
spoofing technique is largely based on 
operating principles of sensors used to capture 
fingerprint images.  
• Software can be used to remember the last finger 
image scanned. An immediate reoccurrence of the 
image may signal an intrusion attempt.  
• A sensor can be used to detect whether the finger is 
“alive” (e.g. measuring temperature or detecting 
pulse) 
 
Attacking the communication channel 
An intruder can use the communication 
channel between a scanner and network to 
tamper with the biometric data.  
• Continuous monitoring of the connection between 
the scanner and the network can be used to prevent 
this type of attack. An interruption in connection 
may signal an intrusion 
• Biometric information can be encrypted to prevent 
eavesdropping 
• Session keys can be used to ensure that biometric 
data is not “replayed” 
Compromising the template 
An intruder can break into the system and 
change the reference template against which 
newly acquired images are compared.  
• Standard information security technologies can be 
used to protect template data 
Attacking the fallback system 
Occasionally, an authorized user may not have 
been previously enrolled in the system. 
Moreover, the system can expect failures from 
time to time. The fall-back procedure, designed 
to take care of these situations, can be taken 
advantage of by an intruder 
• The fallback procedures must be designed in a way 
that foresees possible ways of attempting to trick 
the system 
Adapted from Reid [2004]  
Advantages 
Hand geometry strengths are[Nanavati et al,, 2002]: 
• Hand geometry is able to operate in harsh environments. The technology is not as 
sensitive to light, dust, or temperature as some other biometric technologies.  
• It is a well-established technology. Hand geometry has been used in such 
applications as access control for many years. A number of vendors already provide 
reliable hand geometry stations.  
• It is relatively non-intrusive. Submitting a hand for measurements is certainly less 
intrusive than, for example, positioning one’s eye for iris scanning.  
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• Hand geometry is a relatively stable physiological characteristic. Unlike fingerprints, 
hand geometry is not likely to change significantly in the short term.  
Disadvantages  
The weaknesses of hand geometry include [Nanavati et al., 2002]: 
• The accuracy of hand geometry is inherently limited by the lack of physiological 
variety in hand geometry characteristics among individuals and by the relatively small 
number of hand characteristics that can be captured with a hand scan.  
• The relative dimensions of hand scan stations limit the scope of potential 
applications. Hand geometry stations are usually bulky and, as a result, may not be 
convenient to use in certain applications. For  example, it may not be practical to 
place hand geometry scanning stations near each computer on a corporate network 
• The system cannot enroll certain people (e.g. individuals with a crippled arm). 
Spoofing 
Potential spoofing techniques and mitigation strategies in the case of hand geometry are similar 
to those discussed for fingerprinting. However, reproducing a hand without the knowledge of the 
individual may not be feasible. While an intruder can potentially copy a person’s fingerprint image 
from a flat glass surface and construct a finger with the same fingerprint, reconstructing a hand 
geometry (even with the consent of a user who has access to the system) is much more complex.  
FACE RECOGNITION 
Operating Principles 
The face consists of many distinct micro and macro elements [Reid, 2004]. The macro elements 
include the mouth, nose, eyes, cheekbones, chin, lips, forehead, and ears. The micro features 
include the distances between the macro features (or the distances between macro features and 
reference points) and the size of macro features. In addition, faces, like any body parts, radiate 
heat. Heat radiation patterns can be captured with the help of infrared cameras and used for 
authenticating and identifying users. Face images can be captured either “on the spot” through 
real-time acquisition or by photographs or videos. Four major types of algorithms are used for 
enrolling and matching a face image:  
• Eigenface. The staring point of eigenface algorithm is capturing a two- dimensional 
grayscale image of a face. The unique geometry of the face is then described 
mathematically and stored as a template. When a reference face image is obtained, it 
is also transformed into a two-dimensional grey-scale image and then matched 
against the template. 
• Local Feature Analysis.  The first step under this algorithm is identifying reference 
points on a face image. A reference point can be a corner of the mouth, an end of an 
eyebrow, the center of an eye, and many other “face landscape” features. Reference 
points are detected by analyzing the shading around each feature. For example, the 
image of one’s nose can be surrounded by shadows that can lead the system to 
identify the face image area as a nose and then locate its central point (the tip of the 
nose). After all the necessary reference points are identified, the set of reference 
points is connected with straight lines forming numerous triangles. For example, a 
triangle can be formed by connecting the centers of eyes with each other as well as 
the tip of the nose. The angles of the resulting triangles are then measured and 
recorded in a template. The template is further used for matching newly acquired 
face images. Needless to say, light conditions severely impact the algorithm.  
• Neural Networks. A neural network is a computing paradigm that relies on algorithms 
that imitate the processes of a human brain. In a similar way as our brains learn to 
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recognize faces, a biometric system can be taught to recognize and differentiate 
faces [Nanavati et al., 2002]. Neural networks use a wide array of features to 
determine whether the face image is similar to the one previously stored (template). 
Each feature “votes” on whether the face is similar or not. A correct vote “raises” the 
importance of a particular face feature in further matching attempts. Likewise, an 
incorrect vote lowers the importance of a particular feature as a predictor of whether 
face images match. Over time, the system learns to recognize faces through this 
learning process, which is somewhat similar to a trial and error approach. 
Theoretically, this method can produce greater face recognition success rates in 
complex environments.  
• Automatic face processing. This algorithm uses macro face measurements and 
sizing (e.g. mouth width) to find a match quickly and efficiently. The downside to this 
algorithm is that facial expressions can impact recognition effectiveness (e.g. a smile 
would change mouth width).    
Advantages 
Face recognition’s strengths in comparison with other biometrics are [Nanavati et al., 2002]: 
• Ability to leverage existing equipment and imaging processes. Face recognition 
systems do not require specialized hardware unlike other biometric procedures. 
Existing hardware capable of image processing can be used with face recognition 
software. 
• Ability to operate without physical contact or user complicity. The facial image of an 
individual can be acquired in a non-intrusive way even without the user being aware 
of the procedure. As a result, face recognition systems can operate in surveillance 
mode. Police, government agents, and casinos use face scans to identify criminals.   
• Ability to enroll static images. Most biometric systems require several years to 
deploy, since it takes time to collect biometric data on users. Time delay can be less 
of a problem in the case of face recognition, since existing sources of facial images of 
various groups of individuals are collected over time. Departments of Motor Vehicles 
(DMVs), immigrations offices, and other public agencies collect massive databases of 
facial images taken in controlled environments.  
Disadvantages 
Disadvantages of face biometrics include [Nanavati et al., 2002]: 
• Sensitivity to environment. A number of environmental conditions (e.g. light, 
background composition, camera position and many other factors) impact system 
accuracy. 
• Sensitivity to changes in physiology. Simple changes in physiology (e.g. new hair 
style, make-up, facial hair, glasses) impact system accuracy significantly.  
• Privacy abuse. Since a face image can be taken without the user being aware of it, 
privacy abuse is possible. For example, a face recognition system installed in voting 
booths in Uganda to prevent voter fraud was found to be highly intimidating to voters 
[Nanavati et al., 2002].  
Spoofing 
One of the ways to spoof a face recognition system is to fake a face. A face can be faked by 
obtaining an image of a person’s face (e.g. digital photograph). After an image of an individual’s 
face is captured, the system can be tricked in a number of ways: 
• A two-dimensional face image can be presented to a camera. This scam  may work 
for systems that do not use “active eye” recognition or depth recognition. Active eye 
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recognition makes use of reflective nature of the pupil to locate eyes on a facial 
image. Depth recognition adjusts camera’s focal length to capture macro features of 
a face. If a plain image is presented to the camera, the focal length will be the same 
for all face features and, thus, the system may be able to detect that it is being 
presented with a two-dimensional image of the face.  
• Systems with active eye recognition can also be fooled with the help of a two-
dimensional image. An intruder can cut out the pupil areas in the two-dimensional 
image and use the image as a mask. In this way, the system is presented with real 
eyes, while the face as a whole is simply a two dimensional image of the real face. 
To a certain degree this type of attack is mitigated by requiring the system to detect 
face movement for authentication. [Reid, 2004]. In this way, a still image not 
exhibiting any movement will not be interpreted by the system as a real face.  
• Another way to spoof a face-recognition system is to replay a previously captured 
video of an individual‘s face. The video can be replayed using a laptop or a portable 
DVD player. In this case, the face can exhibit some degree of movement and the 
system requiring face movement may be fooled. However, active eye detection may 
recognize that it is not a real face.  
The spoofing techniques discussed above rely on presenting a static image of a face to the 
system. Even if a recorded video of a face is used, the image can still be viewed as static, since 
the dynamic characteristics of the face in the video are limited to what was recorded. Thus, a 
number of challenge and response methods can be used to mitigate this type of attack. An 
example of a challenge and response method would be asking the individual to blink a random 
number of times in a particular time pattern. Theoretically, even this challenge and response 
method can be fooled by creating a complex video model of an individual capable of generating 
these dynamic face characteristics. However, the model is likely to be prohibitively complex and 
expensive to generate. 
Another potential way of spoofing a face recognition system is to present the system with a face 
artifact.  A face artifact consists of image files that were used by the system during the enrollment 
process. Theoretically, these files can be fed into the system without the individual undergoing a 
predetermined face image acquisition process. One of the ways of dealing with this attack is to 
use encryption to transmit face image data. In this way, it will be difficult if not impossible to 
intercept face image data and feed it back into the system.  
IRIS SCANNING 
Operating Principles 
The iris exhibits a unique mosaic texture which can be used for identification and authentication. 
To capture a person’s iris, the individual needs to look into a camera. The camera must be 
positioned appropriately to localize the image of the iris. After the iris image is captured, simple 
logical operators (XOR and AND) can be used to match the iris image obtained with the one 
previously stored. As two binary sequences (e.g. 101 and 111 can) can be matched by applying 
XOR and AND operators to corresponding bits of each binary sequence, the features of a 
person’s iris can be compared to the features of the iris previously stored in a template using 
similar logical comparison mechanisms.  
Advantages 
Iris biometrics is probably the most promising biometric trait [Reid, 2004]. Iris scan’s advantages 
over other biometric procedures include: 
• The major advantage of iris biometrics is its accuracy. Biometric systems based on 
iris recognition provide virtually no False Acceptance Rate (FAR) and an extremely 
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low False Rejection Rate (FRR) of approximately 0.2% in three attempts1 [Reid, 
2004]  
• The relatively simple matching algorithm based on XOR and AND operators allows 
for extremely fast matching: fir example, 100,000 matches per second can be carried 
out even on a 300MHz machine [Reid, 2004]. 
• Iris texture is a stable characteristic that does not change over time [Nanavati et al., 
2002]. Part of this stability comes from the iris’s protection by the cornea. The iris is 
usually not exposed to harsh conditions and does not change with age.  
Disadvantages 
Disadvantages of iris-scan include [Nanavati et al., 2002]:  
• Iris biometric procedures may be difficult to use for some individuals. For an iris to be 
scanned, a user needs to align a camera with the eye – a procedure that may not be 
easy for disabled individuals or individuals with poor eye sight.  
• Iris-based biometric systems have a propensity towards FRR (Section VI) because 
the strict positioning requirements may make it difficult to obtain a quality iris image. 
An authorized user may not be granted access because, with the strict positioning 
requirements, his or her iris pattern was not scanned properly.  
• Iris scans are perceived to be intrusive by a certain percentage of users. There is 
something about the nature of one’s eye as well as its importance in an individual’s 
life that makes users uncomfortable about submitting their eyes to a scanning 
procedure. Other individuals are worried that the iris scanning camera can damage 
their eye sight. 
• Currently, the market for iris acquisition devices lacks competition or 
standardization2. Only a small number of companies manufacture iris acquisition 
devices all under the license from Irdian [Nanavati et al., 2002]. Thus, it would be 
expensive to develop custom security solutions based on iris scanning.  
Spoofing 
One way to spoof an iris biometric system is to print out a high-quality iris image. The pupil area 
can then be cut out so that an intruder can present his pupil together with the fake iris to a 
camera. This spoofing technique may be possible due to the robustness of some systems – they 
are tolerant to variations in iris image size to loosen strict positioning requirements for iris 
acquisition. Using this hidden vulnerability, an intruder can print out an iris image sufficiently large 
to hold it in hands to align it with their pupil. Fortunately, an iris biometric system can be taught to 
recognize a printed image. No matter how advanced a printing technology is, it uses a particular 
pattern for drawing lines and filling in spaces with color. 
                                                     
1 See Section VI for a discussion of FAR and FRR. 
2 While devices from different vendors may use similar algorithms or operating principles, they 
are not likely to use the same engines. Devices manufactured by different vendors lack common 
standards, for example for communicating with computers or standard middleware,  
Implementation may differ both on the device level and at the middleware level. 
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RETINA SCANNING 
Operating Principles 
The retina is “the surface on the back of the eye that processes light entering through the pupil” 
[Nanavati et al., 2002, p. 106]. The retinas of each individual contain unique patterns of blood 
vessels that can be used for identification. This pattern of blood vessels is a unique physiological 
characteristic that does not change over time. The process of acquiring a retina image is 
relatively complex. Since the retina is an internal surface, specialized hardware and camera 
systems are required for image capture. When the retina is scanned, an individual must gaze 
directly into the lens of a retina-scanning device, remaining perfectly still. Even a slight movement 
can nullify the image acquisition process. In ideal conditions, it usually takes 4-5 seconds to 
acquire a retina image [Nanavati et al., 2002]. The retina biometric is used “exclusively for 
physical access applications and is usually used in environments requiring exceptionally high 
degrees of security and accountability, such as high-level government, military, and corrections 
applications” [Nanavati et al., 2002, p. 106].  
Advantages 
The retina biometric is highly accurate. Since retina patterns are a stable physiological trait and 
retina matching algorithms are robust, the retina biometric is highly resistant to false matching 
[Nanavati et al., 2002].  
Disadvantages 
The retina scanning procedure is perceived by some users as difficult to use and intrusive 
[Nanavati et al., 2002]. Similar to iris scans, the retina scan procedure requires some experience 
and attentiveness from the user. As a result, retina scanning can only be used at present in high-
security and low-volume physical access and attendance monitoring applications. Thus, retina 
scanning procedures may only be appropriate in applications where convenience can be 
sacrificed for increased security. In addition, some users view the retina scan procedure as 
intrusive, making users reluctant to submit their eyes to this process. 
VOICE RECOGNITION 
Operating Principles 
The voice is both a physiological and a behavioral biometric [Reid, 2004]. Voice is influenced by 
physiology. The beautiful sounds that Luciano Povarotti is capable of producing are largely a 
function of his unique physiology.  However, we tend to absorb voice characteristics of people 
that surround us for a substantial period of time. Our voice also changes depending on social 
situation – most people probably use different voices when they speak to a telemarketer, a 
spouse, or a policeman. Our voice also depends on the environment: a stock broker sounds 
differently at home than on a trading floor (hopefully). 
Voice characteristics include pitch, frequency, gain or intensity, short-time spectrum of speech, 
formant frequencies, linear prediction coefficients, cepstral coefficients, spectograms, and nasal 
coarticulation [Nanavati et al., 2002]. Many of these characteristics can only be produced by the 
human voice, which means that even sophisticated audio equipment cannot record and then 
reproduce these characteristics. However, this restriction does not eliminate the possibility of 
spoofing based on playback. The possibility of this type of attack can be significantly reduced by 
detecting some of the voice characteristics.  
The voice can be captured using the existing infrastructure, such as a phone or a microphone 
connected to a computer. Some of the voice interpretation algorithms include [Reid, 2004]: 
• Fixed phrase verification. Under this algorithm, an individual is both enrolled and 
identified based on a single phrase. The enrollment phrase is matched with the 
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phrased obtained from the individual during the identification procedure simply by 
comparing the wave forms of each of the two phrases.  
• Fixed vocabulary verification. A user is enrolled and identified based on a limited 
vocabulary of words. A random sequence of words is generated for the user to 
pronounce aloud. After the individual pronounces these words (e.g. “one, two, four, 
seven”), each word is matched with the word previously recorded from the individual. 
After that, a composite match score is generated based on the extent to which 
individual words match.  
• Flexible vocabulary verification. Under this algorithm, an individual can use any word 
from a given lexicon. During the enrollment process, an individual is asked to repeat 
a series of words from the lexicon. The set of words pronounced during the 
enrollment process must cover all the phonemes (the vocal building block of each 
word) of every word in the lexicon.  During the authentication process, the user is 
asked to speak a word or a number of words from the lexicon. The words are broken 
down into phonemes and then matched with the previously stored phonemes to 
authenticate the user. 
Advantages 
The advantages of voice biometric are [Nanavati et al., 2002]: 
• Ability to leverage existing hardware infrastructure. Voice can be recorded using 
phones or by simply attaching a microphone system to a computer. An organization 
can theoretically get by without purchasing expensive specialized hardware. 
Furthermore, automated telephone systems are now ubiquitous. These existing 
technologies can be leveraged for creating security applications. 
• Resistance to imposters. Some voice characteristics are difficult to fake even using 
high-end audio systems. Systems based on voice biometrics can potentially be more 
secure than even some finger-scan systems.  
• Non-intrusiveness. The voice scanning procedure is perceived to be less intrusive 
than scanning of iris, retina, or even finger.  
Disadvantages 
The disadvantages of the voice biometric include [Nanavati et al., 2002]: 
• Voice is subject to numerous distortion factors. First of all, the type of hardware used 
to record one’s voice can have a significant impact on the quality of the obtained 
voice sample.  For example, the microphones used in phones are not of a high 
quality. But even if high-end voice recording equipment is used, it may still be hard to 
obtain a quality voice sample. A user may not know, for example, how to hold and 
position the microphone properly. Voice can be distorted or masked by background 
noise. Finally, users may unintentionally vary their voice characteristics. 
• Perception of low accuracy. After watching too much TV, some people believe that 
their voice can be faked by a skillful impressionist. As was mentioned previously, 
some voice characteristics cannot be reproduced artificially even using sophisticated 
audio equipment for recording and then playback. Although voices can be faked, it is 
not as easy as some think.  
• Large template size. When compared to other types of biometrics, voice templates 
require a lot of storage space. While finger or iris templates usually occupy up to 1K 
of memory, voice templates can occupy 10K or more.  
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OTHER TYPES OF BIOMETRIC TECHNOLOGIES 
In addition to the major techniques listed in Table 3, biometric techniques include vein pattern 
scanning, detection of individual scent, measurement of earlobes, facial thermogram procedures, 
analysis of individual keystroke dynamics, signature verification, and gait recognition [Ashbourn, 
2000; Delac and Grgic, 2004; Jain et al., 2000; Monrose and Rubin, 2000; Nanavati et al., 2002; 
Schneier, 1999]. These methodologies, described in Table 5, are less developed and are not 
widely used at present.  
Table 5. Less Developed Biometric Applications  
Biometric Type Description 
Vein Pattern Scanning 
(natural physiography) 
The vain pattern on the back of the hand and wrist is scanned 
while the user grips a bar within a specialized scanning device. 
Commercial applications based on this biometric are already 
available in ATM banking.   
Scent 
(natural physiography) 
Since each object distributes an odor that is based on the 
object’s chemical composition, identifying individuals based on 
their unique scent patterns may be possible. However, there are 
many unanswered questions, such as how unique individual 
scent is and whether the scent can be captured easily by 
specialized equipment. 
Measurement of earlobes 
(natural physiography) 
While it is possible to identify unique geometrical characteristics 
of an earlobe, the procedure is likely to be inconvenient and is 
not likely to be more accurate than measuring other body parts.   
Facial thermograms procedures 
(natural physiography) 
The face below the skin emits unique infrared patterns that can 
be captured by a specialized scanning device. While the 
technology is highly accurate, its high cost is probably the main 
factor preventing the emergence of commercial applications.  
Keystroke dynamics 
(bio-dynamics) 
Keystroke dynamics is a behavioral characteristic. Individual 
keystroke dynamics, such as speed of typing, pauses between 
words, and intervals between individual characters, could 
potentially provide on-going identity verification rather just one-
time verification at the beginning of a computer session.   
Signature Verification 
(bio-dynamics) 
A signature is a behavioral characteristic. Signature verification 
is based not only on the appearance of the signature, but also on 
signature dynamics: the pressure applied to the pen, the speed 
at which individual pen stroked are executed, the overall time it 
takes an individual to reproduce his or her signature, and other 
characteristics.  
Gait Recognition 
(bio-dynamics) 
Rhythmic patterns associated with walking stride can be 
potentially used in surveillance. However, many principal 
questions remain unsolved in relation to how this biometric 
methodology might be implemented.  
SOME PROMISING EMERGENT BIOMETRIC TECHNOLOGIES 
Emerging technologies include instant DNA testing and brain wave scanning.  In 10 to 20 years 
these technologies may present a practical and more reliable alternative for instant identity 
verification. 
Instant DNA Testing 
Instant DNA testing could be used for both authentication and identification. Currently, DNA 
testing is extremely accurate but requires specially equipped laboratories, rigorous procedures, 
and takes time. It is extensively used for both identification and authentication purposes in law 
enforcement but currently is not a practical option for real time security applications. However, 
scientists at Northwestern University claim they developed an instant DNA identification 
technique which will eventually be built into a handheld device [Connor, 2002]. 
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Brain Wave Scanning 
Brain wave scanning is a promising technology. Neuroscientist Lawrence Farwell, who is now 
associated with Brain Fingerprinting Laboratory, invented a technique he calls Brain 
Fingerprinting ® (brain wave scanning).  
Brain Fingerprinting® can detect information stored in one’s brain based on electrophysiological 
manifestation of information processing in the brain [Brain Fingerprinting Laboratories, 2005]. 
Information processing occurs in response to certain type of meaningful stimuli. An electrical 
brain wave known as P300 is emitted by the brain when an individual is exposed to particularly 
meaningful or noteworthy stimuli. For example, when an individual is shown a picture of the gun 
she used to kill her husband, the P300 wave is likely to be emitted. However, when the individual 
is shown a picture of a random gun, the P300 wave is not likely to be emitted. The picture of a 
random gun is not as meaningful to her as the picture of the gun actually used in the crime. Brain 
Fingerprinting can also be used for identifying individuals who are likely to pose a terrorist threat. 
A suspected individual would be shown a series of pictures presumably familiar to terrorists such 
as weapons while his brain is being scanned. If the suspect sees a familiar object (for example, a 
picture of a bomb) his brain may emit a P300 wave. If this happens, the investigators may have 
grounds to believe that the individual participated in a terrorist attack.  The Brain Fingerprinting 
technique has already been used in the courtroom to help to establish the innocence or guilt of 
suspects.  
 “Brain fingerprinting” can also be used for identity verification. An individual might be shown a 
series of unique pictures that would be not be seen by anyone else (e.g. randomly generated by a 
computer) and asked to memorize them. In the process of authentication, these pictures could be 
shown again to the individual. Only the authorized person’s brain would emit the right response 
(of course, given that the individual does not have disabilities preventing him from storing and 
retrieving information from memory).  
V. CURRENT AND FUTURE APPLICATIONS OF BIOMETRIC TECHNOLOGY 
On the most abstract level, biometric applications can be divided in three categories [Nanavati et 
al., 2002]: 
• Logical Access. Biometrics can be used to control access to data or information 
(intangible resources). This group of applications can be referred to as network 
security applications.  
• Physical Access. Biometrics can be used to control access to tangible resources or 
premises.  
• Identity Verification. Biometrics can be used to verify the identity of an individual or 
check his or her identity against other data.  
On a more practical level, applications of biometrics can be divided into forensic, civilian and 
commercial applications [Jain et al., 2000]. As presented below in Table 6, each of these broad 
categories has a number of concrete applications. 
Table 6. Applications of Biometric Technologies by Sector 
Law Enforcement  Civilian Commercial 
Criminal investigation 
Corrections monitoring 
Surveillance 
Terrorism prevention 
National ID 
Driver’s license 
Voting and Voter Registration 
Welfare disbursement 
Immigration control 
PC/Network Access 
Physical Access Control 
Time and attendance 
ATM 
Transaction Security 
Surveillance  
Background check 
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LAW ENFORCEMENT 
The history of using biometrics for forensic applications is long and rather glorious. In essence, 
forensic applications of biometric technologies aim at identifying or verifying identity of a suspect, 
detainee, or individual in a law enforcement context [Nanavati et al., 2002]. “Over the past 25 
years, automated fingerprint searches  against local, state, and national databases, as well as 
automated processing of mug shots, have become pervasive criminal identification applications, 
used around the world” [Nanavati et al., 2002, p. 152]. Numerous other types of biometric 
technologies are currently used in law enforcement and crime prevention (Table 7). 
Table 7. Applications of Biometric Technologies in Law Enforcement and Crime Prevention 
Biometric Type Applications Agencies 
Fingerprint PC/Network Access 
 
Most state identification bureaus 
Many police departments 
FBI 
INS 
Retina Identification of prisoners in jail 
 
Cook County, Illinois, Sheriff's 
Office 
Iris Identification of prisoners in jail 
 
Lancaster County, PA 
Sarasota County, FL 
Face Searching mug shots 
Surveillance video cameras 
Driver's licenses 
Driver's licenses 
Los Angeles County, Sheriff 
Newham, England police 
West Virginia 
Illinois 
Hand Prisoner identification 
Probationer monitoring 
Border control 
 
Federal and state prisons 
3 Minnesota prisons 
New York City corrections 
INS 
Voice Border control 
Probationer monitoring 
INS 
Some corrections agencies 
Reprinted with permission from Coleman [1999]  
A relatively new forensic application of biometrics is using face recognition for active surveillance. 
Face recognition systems allow law enforcement agencies to increase surveillance, tracking, and 
apprehension of criminals.  For example, in 1998 Newham, a borough in London, installed 250 
surveillance cameras to feed information to the FaceIt® Surveillance system [Identix Inc., 2000]. 
The system continuously matches the images of people captured by the surveillance cameras 
with a database of suspects and known criminals. If a match is found, the system alerts law 
enforcement agencies about the match. Robert Lack, Newham's Security and Operations 
Manager, credits the system with 40% crime reduction in the borough [Identix Inc., 2000]. 
However, the exact procedure for assessing effectiveness of the system was not reported. 
In the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks, the United States government began exploring 
biometrics technologies for use in preventing acts of terror. Biometrics is one of the technologies 
currently used by the Department of Homeland Security to identify people who might be a threat 
to national security.  
CIVILIAN APPLICATIONS 
National ID 
Using biometrics for national IDs and driver licenses provides a more reliable way of identifying 
individuals [Schimke et al., 2005]. Additional benefits of this application of biometrics include 
prevention of duplicate identities and faster processing of transactions requiring individual 
identification [Nanavati et al., 2002]. Jurisdictions in the Unites States including Illinois, Georgia, 
and West Virginia either deployed or are planning to deploy identification programs based on 
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biometrics. Such countries as Argentina, El Salvador, Panama, Bolivia, Argentina, Nigeria, 
Germany, Korea, and the United Kingdom are either experimenting or already using biometric 
information with national IDs, to some extent.  
Driver’s License (DL) 
In the Unites States, the driver license is the most widely used form of personal identification. 
People fake DLs not so much to be able to drive a car, but to commit other forms of fraud, such 
as passing bad checks, committing credit card fraud, illegally purchasing alcohol and tobacco, 
and stealing others’ identity for all kinds of purposes. Because of that, the United States is 
seeking new ways to control the issuance of DLs and, thus, strengthen the reliability of this form 
of identity [Coleman, 1999]. A number of states use fingerprinting to verify the identity of DL 
recipients. West Virginia was the first state to apply facial recognition to DLs. The major goal of 
this application is to prevent people from obtaining an extra DL for use as a fake ID.  
Voting and Voter Registration 
Voting and voter registration is an extremely important procedure and must be protected against 
possible fraud. Biometrics can help achieve this goal [Nanavati et al., 2002]. Mexico is using 
facial recognition to prevent voting fraud. Face biometrics was also used in Uganda’s 2001 
election for the same purpose. However, the technology encountered some degree of hostility 
from voters in Uganda – voters felt that face recognition compromises the anonymity of the voting 
process. 
Welfare Disbursement   
Biometrics are used in government benefit programs for two purposes: to ensure secure transfer 
of funds to eligible recipients and to prevent “double dipping” – the fraudulent practice where an 
eligible recipient receives governmental support more than once [Coleman, 1999]. Table 8 briefly 
describes the use of biometrics for authentication of welfare recipients in the United States in 
1998. 
Immigration Control  
After the 9/11 attack, the U.S. government began using biometrics in hopes of preventing 
terrorists from entering the United States and for overall tighter control of  visitors to the United 
States. Everyone entering the United States with a visa must now permit fingerprints and 
photographs to be taken and scrutinized by the U.S. Customs Service [BBC News, 2004]. It is 
estimated that the system will generate around five million gigabytes of biometric data per year 
[Betts, 2003]. While this enormous amount of data may certainly contribute to terror prevention, it 
also creates several technical problems. A system with this much data requires ultra-fast  
Table 8. Biometric in Welfare Distribution (1998 Data) 
State Biometric Type Benefit Year Began 
AZ Fingerprints AFDC (Aid For Dependent Children), 
food stamps 
1998 
CA Fingerprints, hand geometry AFDC, GA (General Assistance), food 
stamps 
1991 
CT Fingerprints AFDC, GA 1996 
IL Fingerprints, retina AFDC 1996 
MA Fingerprints, face AFDC, GA, food stamps 1996 
NJ Fingerprints GA 1995 
NY Face, signature fingerprints AFDC, GA, food stamps 1995 
TX Fingerprints AFDC, food stamps 1996 
NC Fingerprints, face AFDC, food stamps, medical 1998 
Reprinted with permission from Coleman [1999]. This data is the latest available to the authors. 
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database and networking technologies to ensure that travelers entering the U.S. are processed 
without significant delays. 
COMMERCIAL APPLICATIONS 
Table 9 gives a brief overview of actual applications of various types of biometrics. The list 
provided in Table 9 is by no means comprehensive – it focuses on some of the main trends in 
commercial application of biometrics.  
PC/Network Access 
Biometrics can be used to complement or replace traditional login/password combination for 
access to computers and networks. One of the advantages of using biometrics for PC/Network 
access is that biometrics are believed to be more secure than traditional PC/Network security 
measures, such as passwords or tokens. Another advantage of biometrics over traditional 
security approaches in the area of PC/Network Access is convenience. Biometrics alleviates the 
burden of remembering different login/password combinations for accessing intangible assets. 
Moreover, swiping a finger to access a computer is more convenient than typing in a username 
and a password. 
Physical Access 
Better security and convenience are also important factors in implementing biometric technology 
for controlling access to facilities and other tangible resources.  Again, swiping a finger on a finger 
scan or submitting one’s face to the face-scan procedure may be more convenient than using 
keys or magnetic cards.  Physical access artifacts can be lost, stolen, or misplaced, causing 
inconvenience for employees. Moreover, some employees share their access artifacts with 
others, which can create additional security vulnerability for the company. However, it always 
takes time for employees to absorb a new technology. Biometric access systems are likely to 
result in a higher failure rate when compared to, say, keys. Reported cases describe employees 
smashing a biometric device in despair after several unsuccessful attempts to access a premise.  
Time and Attendance Monitoring 
Using biometrics in time and attendance applications can mean better convenience for 
employees and better fraud protection for the employer. “Buddy punching”, a situation where an 
employee “clocks in” for his or her buddy, is relatively common. When, a finger is used for 
clocking in, an employee must lend a finger to the “punching buddy”. This may not be worth even 
a year’s pay. 
ATM Access 
ATMs are important nodes in the financial network of many countries. ATM security can be 
strengthened with the help of biometrics. Currently, a number of banks and other financial 
institutions around the world use various forms of biometrics (e.g. hand vein scanning) for ATM 
access [Asawa et al., 2005]. Still, using biometrics with ATM access is not common. Since ATMs 
are used on a large scale by diverse populations, a number of issues must be resolved before 
ATM biometrics becomes a commonplace. For example, when Citibank experimented with using 
biometrics as an authentication tool in ATMs [Mearian, 2002], the company encountered serious 
difficulties and decided that they were not ready to implement the technology. Apart from the 
numerous technical difficulties that usually accompany any emerging technology, implementing 
biometric identification in ATMs required substantial startup resources to capture customers’ 
biometric information and educate the public on how to use ATM biometric identification 
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Table 9. Commercial Applications of Biometrics3 
Biometric 
Type 
Application 
Type 
Companies 
Network/ PC 
Access 
The city of Oceanside, California; Credit Union Central, British Columbia; 
The Guardian Life Insurance Company of America, USA 
Physical 
Access/ Time    
and 
Attendance 
Hermes Pension Management Limited, UK; Credit Suisse, Switzerland; 
Shell Petroleum, UK; Fujitsu, UK; O’Rourke Construction Company, UK 
POS A number of small companies in the United States use BioPay – an 
automated terminal where purchases can be paid for by scanning a finger 
(instead of swiping a credit card or paying cash) 
ATM Purdue Employees Federal Credit Union, IN 
Wireless 
Security 
HP manufactures iPAQ PDAs with fingerprint biometric access protection 
Fingerprint 
Background 
Check 
Aramco Saudi Arabia National Oil Company; Melon Bank, USA; ING 
Direct, USA 
ATM  
 
Japanese banks used hand vein recognition technology from Fujitsu to 
enhance ATM security 
Physical 
Access 
Disney World: gate access to attractions; San Francisco International 
Airport: hand geometry is used to control access to restricted areas 
Hand 
Time and 
Attendance 
McDonald’s uses fingerprinting to prevent “buddy punching” among its 
restaurant employees in Venezuela   
Physical 
Access 
Retina scanning is used for physical access control in organizations 
requiring highly secure environment, such as power plants and some 
research labs 
Retina 
POS Venerable Bede School, UK: retina scan for library check-out and 
cafeteria payment 
Physical 
Access 
Vertical Screen; North Florida Medical Centers; Nine Zero hotel, Boston: 
retina scanning for room access for some of its luxury suits 
Iris 
POS The Charlotte/Douglas International Airport, NC and the Flughafen 
Frankfort Airport, Germany: iris scan for streamlining boarding of frequent 
fliers  
Physical 
Access 
Berlin Airport, Germany Face 
 
Surveillance  
A number of casinos in the United States, Canada, Puerto Rico and 
Aruba use face surveillance solution from Biometrica Systems to identify 
unwanted patrons 
PC/Network 
access 
BMC Software: password reset over the phone; INTRUST bank: internal 
wire transfers 
Physical 
access 
City of Baltimore: evening and weekend access to five city main buildings 
Telephone 
security 
 
University of Maryland, College Park: toll-free long distance lines for 
faculty and staff; GTE TSI: speaker verification as a part of the wireless 
security program 
Time and 
attendance 
 
SOC Credit Union: Time and attendance monitoring of part-time 
employees; Salvation Army: time and attendance monitoring of workers 
Voice4 
Transaction 
Security 
Glenview State Bank: transfer of money between accounts for customers; 
Home Shopping Network: automated product ordering over the phone  
 
                                                     
3 This table was compiled from numerous online and offline sources.  
4 This section adopted from Markowitz [2000] 
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Transaction Security 
Biometric technology can be used to strengthen transactions conducted from remote locations 
(e.g. via a phone, Internet, or Intranet). The biometric, such as voice recognition or fingerprinting, 
can be used to complement or replace traditional authentication mechanisms. For example, voice 
recognition is already used to authenticate a customer wishing to perform a financial transaction 
over the phone [Markowitz, 2000]. In a similar manner, fingerprints can be used to authenticate a 
person during e-commerce transactions.  
Surveillance 
Using biometrics (mainly face recognition) is a relatively new application. A number of casinos 
around the word use automated face surveillance systems to identify unwanted customers (e.g. 
customers who were previously caught cheating or causing some trouble). One of the 
advantages of this application is that the procedure is not intrusive and can be used without 
significant (if any) cooperation from casino patrons. Another advantage of this system is that it 
frees up staff resources to some extent, since security guards can spend less time attempting to 
identify troublemakers. However, the effectiveness of such systems in recognizing unwanted 
customers is still not proven. 
Background Check 
Many organizations cannot afford to hire employees with questionable backgrounds. Biometrics 
(usually fingerprints) can be used to check the background of potential employees. This system 
may not require a significant amount of time to get off the ground, since numerous digital 
fingerprint databases of criminals exist. A software application can be installed on the top of one 
of these databases to get the system working.  
VI. BIOMETRIC SYSTEM PERFORMANCE 
TECHNICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Computer-powered biometrics is still an emerging technology. Because computer-enabled 
biometrics is not mature, organizations considering using the technology need to assess its 
performance before proceeding with implementation. Performance of a biometric security system 
can be evaluated in terms of its accuracy, storage requirements, and speed [Jain et al., 2000].  
FNR and FMR 
Mistakes are always possible in biometric systems. The system can accept an impostor as a valid 
individual (a false match) or reject a valid individual (a false no match) [Jain et al. 2000]. These 
types of mistakes constitute two important variables for assessing system performance: False No 
Match Rate (FNR) and False Match Rate (FMR). These two variables are correlated negatively. 
Indeed, if the system is designed to operate at a high level of accuracy, even a slight interference 
(such as dust, or light conditions,) may result in the system not recognizing a valid individual. 
Conversely, a system which operated at a lower level of accuracy may accept an imposter as an 
authorized individual, making the system more vulnerable to intrusion. This limitation makes it 
necessary to seek a balance in the level of accuracy along the Receiver Operating 
Characteristics (ROC) line (Figure 3).  The ROC represents an estimation model for system 
accuracy in a given test environment [Jain et al. 2000]. 
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Figure 3. Receiver Operating Characteristics [Jain et al. 2000] 
FTE 
Another measure of performance of biometric systems is Failure to Enroll Rate (FTE) [Navati et 
al., 2002]. FTE can be defined as “the probability that a given individual will be unable to enroll in 
a biometric system” [Navati et al., 2002, p. 33]. The two major  reasons for FTE are: 
1. An individual’s biometric characteristics may be insufficiently distinctive or replicable. For 
example, older people or people whose work involves manual labor may have more 
“blurry” fingerprints, making it difficult for the system to enroll them.  
2. The design of a biometric system (e.g. its ergonomics) can make it difficult for certain 
groups of people to enroll. For example, the study by UKPS [2005] found biometric data 
(face, iris, and fingerprint) from younger or healthy individuals results in more accurate 
authentication  when compared to biometric data obtained from older or disabled 
individuals. In the study, the 55+ age group found it more difficult to position themselves 
for fingerprint enrollment than the 18-54 age group. 
Moreover, the study found that it is harder for the system to record fingerprints of individuals with 
large fingers (e.g. overweight individuals). Iris enrollment success for participants under 60 was 
higher than those above 60. As a group, enrollment success for disabled participants was lower, 
with 0.62% of disabled participants failing to enroll in any of the biometrics (face, iris, or 
fingerprint). Table 10 summarizes the comparative FTE rate for “quota participants” (a 
representative sample of 2000 people drawn from the UK population) and “disabled participants” 
(750 individuals with some form of disability). 
Storage and Other Technical Requirements  
Biometric technologies require more storage, bandwidth, and processing power than traditional 
security technologies. Storing digitized human body patterns requires more computer memory 
than is required, for instance, for storing passwords (Table 11). A system that uses text for 
profiling users generates only a fraction of the five petabytes that would be generated by the 
same number of users in the US-VIST system, where each entrant to the U.S. submits his or her 
fingerprints and his or her face image. 
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Table 10. Comparative FTE Rates  
Biometric 
Type 
FTE 
(Quota 
Participants) 
FTE 
(Disabled 
Participants) 
Additional Considerations 
Face 0% 2% 
Maintaining the correct position for facial biometric 
enrollment was a problem for some disabled 
participants with physical impairment or learning 
disabilities 
Iris 10% 39% 
Asian and white participants had lower FTE than 
black participants. Participants under 60 years of 
age had lower FTE than participants over 60 
years  
Fingerprint 0% 4% 
Participants with a learning or physical disability 
had higher FTE than other disabled participants 
and quota participants 
Adapted from UKPS [2005] 
Table 11. Comparative Template Size for Biometrics 
Biometric 
Type Voice Signature Face Iris Finger Retina 
Hand 
Geometry 
Template 
Size 
(bytes) 
2,000-10,000 1,500 1,300 512 250 96 9 
Adapted from Nanavati et al. [2002] 
 
In addition to storage requirements, transferring scanned biometrics requires expanded network 
bandwidth. Moreover, the computer processing power requirements for matching a user name 
and a password with a particular record in a database of logins and passwords are not nearly as 
high as for applying complex pattern recognition algorithms to biometric input. These increased 
requirements for computer processing capacity are closely related to system speed. Unless 
sufficient computer resources are provided, a biometric system does not function at an 
acceptable performance level.  
SOCIAL PERSPECTIVE 
In addition to purely technical criteria for evaluating system performance, social factors can also 
play a big role in the overall system effectiveness. System evaluation measures on the human 
side involve acceptability and circumvention [Jain et al., 2000].  Acceptability is the extent to 
which people are willing to accept a biometric solution in their daily lives. It can be argued that 
acceptability consist of two sub-factors: intrusiveness and ease of use. Some of the scanning 
techniques may be invasive and troublesome, which may cause end-user resistance. 
Circumvention refers to how easy it is to fool a system through fraudulent means. People may not 
be willing to sacrifice their privacy knowing that systems can be easily spoofed. Acceptability and 
circumvention is not only about subjective human perceptions. Users’ perceptions towards the 
system will determine whether the system is used effectively (or used at all).  
VII. PRIVACY ISSUES 
Each type of biometric provides irrefutable proof of one’s identity [Jain et al., 2004]. A biometric is 
not a login/password combination that can be easily modified. A biometric is not an ID that can be 
nullified in case of theft and then reissued. A person has only one instance of each biometric trait 
and will never have a new one. Once a user submits his or her biometric to a system, the user is 
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in the system for good. Because of that, users are concerned about the privacy aspects of 
biometric technology [Jain et al., 2004]: 
• Will this undeniable proof of identity be used to track the individual beyond his or her 
interaction with a system requiring the user’s biometric information? Moreover, can 
this type of tracking be carried out without the individual being aware of it? 
• Is it possible that biometric data will be used for unintended purpose? For example, 
the fingerprints obtained from individual for access control can be matched with the 
fingerprints in a database of criminals.  
• Will the biometric data be used to cross-link independent records from the same 
person (e.g. health insurance and grocery shopping)? 
Individuals are concerned that with the help of biometric technologies, his or her privacy will be 
compromised. Altman [1975, p.24] defines privacy as “…the selective control of access to the 
self,” while Mason [1986] looks at privacy as the extent to which an individual is required to reveal 
information about himself or his association with others.  One of the crucial questions related to 
privacy is “what things can people keep to themselves and not be forced to reveal to others?” 
[Mason, 1986, p. 5].  
In light of the above definitions, biometrics-based identification technologies, such as facial 
recognition, appear to pose a great privacy risk. A security camera does not ask for consent 
before capturing an image. Control over personal information is therefore weakened.  Agre 
[2003], a strong opponent of facial recognition, presents a comprehensive list of arguments 
against its widespread adoption and use:  
… automatic face recognition in public places, including commercial spaces such 
as shopping malls that are open to the public, should be outlawed. The dangers 
outweigh the benefits…The potential for abuse is astronomical. Pervasive 
automatic face recognition could be used to track individuals wherever they go… 
The information from face recognition systems is easily combined with 
information from other technologies. Among the many "biometric" identification 
technologies, face recognition requires the least cooperation from the 
individual… The technology is hardly foolproof…Among the potential downsides 
are false positives, for example that so-and-so was "seen" on a street frequented 
by drug dealers… Yet the conditions for image capture and recognition in most 
public places are far from ideal. Shadows, occlusions, reflections, and multiple 
uncontrolled light sources all increase the risk of false positives… Face 
recognition is nearly useless for the application that has been most widely 
discussed since the September 11th attacks on New York and Washington: 
identifying terrorists in a crowd… 5 
While identification systems invoke Orwellian or, more currently, Minority Report images of a total 
surveillance society, authentication systems pose a threat of their own. Schneier [1999], a well-
known cryptologist and computer security expert, warns:  
Biometrics don’t handle failure well, Once someone steals your biometric, it 
remains stolen for life; there’s no getting back to a secure situation. 
Indeed, an individual only has one set of fingerprints. Once someone’s fingerprints are stolen, 
they are stolen for life. No governmental agency can annul your old fingerprints and issue you 
new ones. The dilemma here is that biometrics can help prevent identity theft but can also, 
                                                     
5 Reprinted with permission from Philip Agre 
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simultaneously, complicate the problem of identity theft, as argued by Schneier in the quote 
above.  
Still, many in the biometrics industry believe that properly deployed biometrics will increase 
privacy, since if an individual’s biometrics are known, no other information such as race, gender, 
or social security number is required. Moreover, it can be argued that privacy threats come not as 
much from the nature of the technology itself, but rather from the particular way in which the 
technology is applied and from the system design used to support the applications [Nanavati et 
al., 2002].  This sentiment is not limited to the biometrics industry. The well-known sociologist 
Amitai Etzioni [1999] believes that benefits of privacy should be weighed against its costs and 
that biometric technologies may bring about huge benefits to consumers and businesses as well 
as enhance privacy.  Etzioni [1999] believes Big Brother fears are overstated. He believes that 
new identification technologies do not control individuals – totalitarian governments do. Thus,  
“Strengthening the foundations of civil society is the best defense against 
totalitarianism, not trying vainly to return the genie of biometrics into the bottle 
from which it already has escaped.” Etzioni [1999]. 
Still, privacy concerns must be addressed and those concerns seem only likely to increase with 
the future adoption of technologies such as DNA fingerprinting. The biometrics industry and 
privacy advocates both favor adoption of comprehensive regulations to prevent possible biometric 
abuses and protect privacy and civil rights while allowing the industry to develop.  They disagree, 
however, on the source of those regulations. Many privacy advocates favor government 
regulation, contending that industry self-regulation will fail. Clarke [2004] laments “…self-
regulation means protection of the sheep by the wolves; and funnily enough the wolves pay more 
attention to their own objectives than to those of the sheep.”  
VIII. IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH 
Biometrics is an evolving technology. Because of the technology’s relative immaturity, numerous 
challenges must be overcome in system performance, user acceptance, technology diffusion, 
system security, and privacy among others. These problems call for a multidisciplinary research 
approach.  
The solution to the challenge of biometric system performance may lie in Computer Science and 
Engineering. While some types of biometric technologies (e.g. fingerprinting) achieved levels of 
performance which make these applications acceptable for everyday use, many other types of 
biometric technologies need performance improvements to become viable security solutions. The 
focus of research on improving the performance of biometric systems is likely to be in the 
computer infrastructure associated with biometric solutions and algorithms and methods of 
biometric technologies.  
User acceptance of biometric technology and diffusion of biometrics within organizations and 
countries are other potentially fruitful avenues for research. Even the most reliable, efficient, and 
productive technology can do little for an organization unless users adopt the technology. 
Adoption of biometric technology may be influenced by both objective (e.g. the speed at which 
biometric devices authorize an individual) and subjective factors (e.g. attitudes and perceptions 
towards the new technology).  
A number of factors can prevent biometrics from being adopted by organizations and counties. 
For example, using biometrics as a security tool may require substantial modifications of the 
computer infrastructure used to support the technology. Moreover, diffusion of biometric 
technologies may require modification or even total reengineering of both technical and 
managerial security procedures currently in place in organizations. These issues clearly lie within 
the domain of Information Systems research.  
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Information security and privacy in the context of biometric technology may influence user 
acceptance of biometrics and diffusion of the technology. Technical and managerial (in the case 
of security) and legal (in the case of privacy) research may find solutions that will minimize the 
negative impact of security and privacy concerns on the adoption and diffusion of biometric 
technologies.  
IX. CONCLUSION 
Biometrics relies on a body of knowledge developed over centuries. Advancements in computer 
technology brought biometrics to a higher level of effectiveness, allowing for use of the 
technology in a variety of security applications.  In many ways, biometrics is more reliable than 
traditional security approaches. However, a number of unresolved issues (such as privacy 
concerns and relatively high cost of large-scale biometric solutions) often make biometrics a less 
attractive alternative in comparison with traditional security measures. Advances in computing 
technology and related areas of research gradually allow for better processing of biometric 
information. As businesses gain more experience in deploying biometric security measures, 
biometrics should become a major security technology in the years ahead.  
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